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Protocols and algorithms, part 2 | page 6 of 12 |
Here's a very simple example of a
strong algorithm built into a weak protocol. Consider an
encryption product designed to allow Alice to send
confidential messages to Bob in e-mail. Suppose that the
product utilizes the "unbreakable" algorithm E. Even against
the "unbreakable" algorithm, Mallory has many ways to
intercept Alice's plain text, if the rest of the protocol is
weak. For example, Mallory might have ways of intercepting
the key, making the "unbreakable" encryption irrelevant (the
key might not be stored securely, or might be transmitted
without itself having adequate security). Or, the plain text
might not travel the whole way as cipher text, but rather
travel as vulnerable plain text for part of its trip (say from
Alice's workstation to her mail server). Or, once decrypted
(or before being encrypted in the first place), the message
might be stored insecurely. To use a cliche, Mallory need
not attack the "unbreakable" algorithm if the other links in
the chain are weaker.
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